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Introduction 
According to the Predictive Processing (PP) framework, perception, action, 
and perhaps a large portion of cognition are underpinned by a mechanism 
of prediction error minimization. On this view, the central nervous system 
builds a hierarchical generative model whose job is to recapitulate the 
causal structure of the environment. The model generates a cascade of 
‘mock’ predictions about incoming sensory stimuli. These predictions are 
matched against actual input and revised to minimize the discrepancy 
between the way the sensory organs are stimulated and the way they are 
predicted to be stimulated. What gets propagated up the hierarchy is just 
the prediction error signal that signifies the divergence between the two.  
Each level of the hierarchy minimizes the error only relative to a level 
directly below. The gain on the prediction error signal is mediated by 
precision estimations, so that, depending on the variance of the sensory 
signal, the processing can be modulated to rely more on the input or the 
internal dynamics (‘prior knowledge’) of the system. Perception on this view 
is a matter of minimizing the error by matching the internal estimates 
(‘hypotheses’) to actual environmental causes of the sensory signal. Action 
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is a matter of intervening on the environment to match its state to internal 
estimates so that the prediction error is minimized (for reviews, see: Clark, 
2013, 2016b; Hohwy, 2013; Wiese & Metzinger, 2017). And cognition can be 
hypothesized to result from an off-line activation of the same predictive 
machinery primarily involved in perception and action (see Pezzulo, 2017). 
PP is surrounded by an aura of revolution, as many see in it an extremely 
ambitious framework that promises to provide a long-awaited (at least by 
some) theoretical unification for the sciences of cognition. How this 
supposed revolution fits into existing debates about the nature of cognition 
is now hotly debated. PP was initially construed in a manner that dovetails 
with traditional approaches in cognitive science, i.e. ones that see cognition 
as matter of inferential, exclusively intracranial processes involving richly 
structured representational states (Hohwy, 2013, in press). Following Clark 
(2015, 2016b), I will call this interpretation of PP ‘conservative’. However, 
recently a number of researchers have argued that construing PP in 
conservative terms is mistaken. These authors opt for a ‘radical’ reading of 
PP, one that marries the framework with the idea that cognition is 
completely or largely non-representational as well as body- and 
environment-involving (Allen & Friston, 2016; Bruineberg, Kiverstein & 
Rietveld, 2016; Clark, 2016a, 2016b; Hutto, 2017; Orlandi, 2016, 2017). Such 
views situate PP firmly within the 4E approaches to understanding and 
studying cognition.   
It seems that the literature is now shifting toward this latter, radical 
reading of PP. Perhaps one major reason behind this is the recognition that 
the PP framework finds proper theoretical home within the larger context 
of the Free Energy Principle (FEP; see e.g. Friston, 2010, 2013; Friston & 
Stephan, 2007). The FEP states that to avoid circumstances with high 
surprisal (i.e. ones that endanger the organism’s homeostatic integrity and 
are unlikely given its phenotype), living creatures minimize the 
information-theoretic quantity of free energy. The FEP comes from a 
theoretical biology and applies to all, even single-cell organisms. Because, 
under Gaussian assumptions, long-term prediction error is equivalent to 
free energy, there is a tight connection between FEP and PP. PP naturally 
emerges as a theory of how the central nervous system, in some species, 
enables organisms to self-organize by avoiding surprising states. Perhaps 
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PP provides a sketch of a causal mechanism through which living creatures 
implement the FEP (Klein, 2016). The exact nature of the connection 
between FEP and PP is beyond the scope of the paper. I take it that although 
FEP puts crucial constraints on our understanding of PP (this will become 
apparent in the discussion to come), the two can be considered as distinct to 
a degree. One is a theory of life, the other is a theory of cognitive architecture 
tightly connected to the first. In this paper, I focus on the latter. 
The aim of the present paper is to revisit the conservative construal of 
PP, as it is not entirely clear what this approach to understanding the 
framework is committed to exactly. It is all too easy to treat the conservative 
approach as naively attached to an outdated, overly intellectualist and 
internalist view of cognition. I aim to review, clarify, and disentangle the 
conservative commitments of PP. I take these commitments to be distinct 
from each other and at least partially independent. I propose that these 
commitments are threefold: (1) the commitment to representationalism; (2) 
the commitment to the notion of inference as subserving perception and 
action; and (3) the commitment to internalism, where internalism means 
that the constitutive basis of cognition does not extend beyond the central 
nervous system. I want to investigate and interpret each of those 
commitments in a way that is both grounded in PP and charitable towards 
proponents of the conservative approach. The discussion to follow will show 
that whatever genuine conservatism can be found in PP, it is as ecumenical 
towards 4E approaches as conservatism gets (this amounts to a 
intermediate, moderate position, not unlike the one proposed in: Dolega, 
2017). This paper is largely a review which aims to group ideas already 
scattered throughout the literature and show how they fit together. 
I start (in Section 1) by addressing the role that the notion of 
representation plays in PP. I argue that this notion can be interpreted in a 
weak (pragmatist) or strong (strictly realist) way. I claim that even 
realistically construed, representations as postulated by PP are largely 
within the spirit of the 4E approaches. In Section 2, I argue that PP makes 
use of a liberal, and yet non-trivial notion of inference. This sort of 
inferentialism boils down to the claim that the transitions between 
representational states postulated by PP are under internal control and 
truth-preserving (they approximately follow a truth-preserving rule). In 
Paweł Gładziejewski 
Just How Conservative Is Conservative Predictive Processing? 
[101] 
Section 3, I argue that PP’s pretensions to internalism are not justified by the 
conceptual resources of the predictive framework itself. In particular, the 
notion of a Markov blanket is not enough to justify the commitment to 
internalism. I discuss how PP relates to some other, internalism-friendly 
ways of delineating the boundaries of mind already present in the literature. 
1. The commitment to representationalism 
1.1. Weak and strong representationalism of PP 
Perhaps the most obvious motivation to treat PP as committed to 
representational states stems from the fact that the framework 
conceptualizes perception in terms of Bayesian inference. Minimizing the 
prediction error can be treated as equivalent to maximizing the posterior 
probability of hypotheses about the causes of the incoming sensory signal. 
When looked at this way, PP is simply filled with semantic notions. The 
perceptual system comes up with ‘hypotheses’ about distal states of 
environment, using ‘beliefs’ about which distal causes are most likely 
(priors) and about what sort of sensory ‘evidence’ is to be expected given 
some hypothesis (prior likelihoods). These hypotheses and prior beliefs are 
semantically evaluable: they can go wrong in the sense of misrepresenting 
the way things are. This all should not come as a surprise, as in any Bayesian 
theory of perception, perceptual states are individuated by their 
representational relations to the environment (Rescorla 2013). 
However, the mere fact that semantic notions are at use does not 
necessarily mean a win by default for a proponent of a conservative reading 
of PP. There are in fact two significantly distinct ways to understand PP’s 
commitment to representationalism. On what we can call a weak reading, 
the representational notions at play merely serve as what Frances Egan calls 
‘intentional gloss’ (Egan, 2010, 2014; for proposals that explicitly interpret 
PP's commitment to representationalism by invoking Egan's account of 
conent, see: Downey, 2017; Wiese, 2017).2 On Egan’s account of content and 
its role in cognitive science, to make sense of physical transactions within a 
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given (computational) system of interest, its internal structures and states 
are mapped onto abstract mathematical entities (like numeric values). The 
attribution of ‘mathematical contents’ enables the researchers to make 
sense of the computations (e.g. the operation of addition) that the system in 
question performs. However, this is not enough to get a full understating of 
the system engaged in some environment-specific cognitive task. To explain 
how computing some function contributes to the exercise of a cognitive 
capacity, ‘cognitive’ contents must be ascribed, i.e. contents that relate parts 
of the internal machinery to parts of the task-specific environment. 
According to weak reading of the representational commitment, this is 
exactly the case with the sematic notions at use in PP. These contents are 
ascribed to the error-minimizing computational machinery to get an 
understanding of how it is related to the environment, a feat that is hardly 
achievable with purely physical and computational description. 
Now, the important thing to take from this is that under this weak 
interpretation, any content to be found in perceptual states postulated by PP 
is of derived nature. Intentional properties (cognitive contents) are ascribed 
to the internal machinery for purely pragmatic reasons. That is, the internal 
states do not have cognitive contents intrinsically or essentially, but purely 
in virtue of interpretative acts on part of the researchers engaged in 
explaining cognitive functions. Thus construed, content is not a causally 
efficacious property of ‘hypotheses’ or ‘prior beliefs’, but may be rather seen 
as nothing more than a useful fiction (Downey, 2017; for a discussion of 
fictionalism about representation, see Sprevak, 2013). Overall, this sort of 
view renders PP representational in such a minimal sense that not many 
proponents of the 4E approaches would presumably be moved by it. After 
all, on this weak reading, what we are dealing with is simply a 
representational gloss on a non-representational mechanism. The 
representational vocabulary may be of crucial heuristic value, but cognition 
as such turns out contentless. 
Still, there is a far stronger way to interpret PP’s commitment to 
representationalism. On this reading, PP postulates a rich set of states with 
real, causally efficacious representational content. The justification for such 
a view comes from a close inspection of the role played in PP’s overall 
computational machinery by the generative model. The generative model is 
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supposed to ‘recapitulate’ the causal structure of the environment and send 
a top-down stream of multi-level, cascading sensory predictions. There are 
strong reasons to regard the generative model as contentful and engaged in 
a nontrivially representational role (for more detailed and closely related 
discussions, see: Gładziejewski, 2016; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2017; Wiese, 2017; 
Williams, 2017). First, it generates, in perceptual inference, estimates of the 
environment which guide cognitive system’s practical engagements with 
the environment. It is action-guiding. Second, the model’s ability to play this 
function is dependent on how well the functional relationships between 
encoded variables resemble the causal structure of the environment. The 
degree of structural match between the model and the environment is 
causally relevant to a degree in which the model is effective at enabling 
adaptive, self-maintaining actions (see Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017). 
This way, content becomes the fuel of practical success, not just a matter of 
passively mirroring the environment. Third, the model performs a largely 
endogenously-controlled, predictive simulation. It exhibits at least some 
degree of detachment or independence from current sensory stimulation. It 
could be argued that the simulations in question can be run purely off-line, 
i.e. outside of any direct engagements with the environment (Pezzulo, 
2017). Fourth, insofar as the model undergoes correction in light of the 
prediction error, it can be said to be capable of detecting cases when its 
representations are inaccurate. More precisely, the Kullbach–Leibler 
divergence between true posterior and recognition (model-based) 
probability distributions can be understood as a sort of measure of 
misrepresentation (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2017). The lesson, then, is that the 
generative model constitutes an action-guiding, detachable structural 
representation, capable of detectable representational error. This is a robust 
and metaphysically realist incarnation of representationalism, arguably 
immune to recent trivializing arguments against representation (see 
Gładziejewski, 2015, 2016; Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017). 
1.2. Strong representationalism about PP: how conservative? 
Let us focus further on PP’s strong representationalism, as this is what 
proponents of 4E approaches would presumably take issue with. It could be 
suggested that by invoking the concept of an internal model, conservative 
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rendering of PP construes representations involved in perception as action-
neutral, disembodied inner replicas or reconstructions of the world (Clark, 
2015, 2016b). On closer inspection, this sort of assessment turns out unfair 
towards conservatism. In fact, as far as robust and metaphysically realist 
representationalism goes, the (strong) notion of representation in PP is very 
much compatible with the spirit of 4E approaches.3 There are four reasons 
to see PP’s commitment to strong representationalism as not-so-
conservative after all. 
First, note that PP postulates a complex processing architecture 
subserving the process of minimizing the prediction error. The generative 
model is just a part, albeit important, of this larger architecture. It is entirely 
possible that this scheme includes both representational and 
nonrepresentational aspects or parts. Even strong commitment to 
representationalism in PP does not have to entail a view on which all there 
is to cognitive processing is representation-munching. In addition to the 
generative model, PP comes with at least three other posits: (1) the sensory 
signal which results from the world affecting the sensory apparatus of an 
organism, (2) the prediction error signal which is propagated bottom-up, 
and (3) precision estimators which regulate the gain on the prediction error 
signal. For each of those posits, we may ask whether its functioning is 
representational in nature. Although a case could be made that precision 
estimators are representational (Wiese, 2016), the same may not apply to 
the sensory signal. The latter acts as a mere causal mediator incapable of 
representational error (Gładziejewski, 2017). And there is still a further 
question of whether the bottom-up error signals earn a representational 
reading (Orlandi, 2016 can be read as providing a negative verdict here). 
The point is that PP does not come with wholesale representationalism; 
there may be purely non-representational structures and processes 
involved in perception and action control. 
Second, even on the strong reading of PP’s representationalism, the 
representations in question are anything but action-neutral. Remember that 
considered in the context of FEP, the process of minimizing the prediction 
error is merely a way of achieving a pragmatic goal of keeping an organism 
                                                          
3 That is unless, of course, one is committed to full-blown antirepresentationalism. 
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within conditions that help maintain it in a far-from-thermodynamic-
equilibrium state. This is directly achieved through action, construed in PP 
as minimizing the prediction error by engaging reflex arcs to quash 
proprioceptive prediction error. And perception (perceptual inference) is 
there to provide guidance for action; estimating the causes of the sensory 
signal functions to enable adaptive engagement with environment. In other 
words, on the PP view of things, building a structural representation of 
environment is not an end in itself but a tool of self-maintenance (Williams, 
2017). This is in line with those approaches in the literature that try to recast 
representationalism so that it becomes not an alternative but an ally to 4E 
approaches (Bickhard, 1999; Rosenberg & Anderson, 2004). 
Third, the content of representations postulated by PP is organism-
relative and shaped by the organism’s embodiment. To see this, PP once 
again must be considered within the proper context of FEP. Given that 
perception is ultimately a tool for self-maintentance, the content of the 
internal models is naturally expected to be strategically selective (Burr & 
Jones, 2016; Clark, 2013, 2015; Williams, 2017). What is ‘reconstruced’ in 
internal models of prediction-error-minimizing-agents are those aspects of 
the environment which constitute the organism’s Umwelt, i.e. the ones 
which the organism depends on in its practical engagements with the 
environment. Furthermore, given that one situation can be associated with 
different suprisals for different types of organisms (what has large surpirisal 
for a human phenotype may not be surprising for a cod phenotype), it is 
natural to hypothesize that the content of those models will differ from 
species to species (Williams, 2017). Also, the organism’s body plays a non-
trivial role in constraining the contents of generative models. To learn the 
causal structure of its surroundings, the prediction-error-minimizing-agent 
needs to intervene on the environment, where those interventions serve as 
‘experiments’ that enable the system to disambiguate between alternative 
hypotheses. The body plays a crucial role here, as it serves as a reliable, 
readily-available ‘laboratory’ (Burr & Jones, 2016). The sort of statistical 
patterns most readily accessible and learnt are those that the depend on the 
bodily interactions with environment.  
Fourth, consider the question of the vehicles of representations in PP. 
Here, of particular interest is how PP deals with the idea of detached 
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representations, that is representations used for off-line cognition instead 
of for perception or action control. On PP view of things, imagery, 
counterfactual reasoning, action planning or dreaming could be understood 
in terms of generative models run is simulation mode – in a way that is fully 
or partially freed from the “sensory enslavement” of direct interaction with 
the environment (see e.g. Hobson & Friston, 2012; Pezzulo, 2017; Seth, 
2014). Simulations of this sort could generate a cascade of top-down 
sensory signals, activating levels relatively low within the hierarchy. This 
way, generative models could run simulations that span multiple levels of 
the processing hierarchy and bring about patterns of neural activity that 
resemble to those that accompany perception and action. If this is so, then 
representational vehicles underlying off-line cognition will not comprise of 
amodal, body-neutral neural code, but will rather involve neural machinery 
primarily involved in modality-specific (this includes interoception, see 
Seth, 2013) on-line cognition. This again connects nicely with what some 
proponents of the embodied approach have argued for (Barsalou, 1999; 
Goldman, 2012). 
2. The commitment to inference 
The second conservative commitment of PP relates to the notion of 
inference. The motivation for it stems from the idea of the external world as 
a sort of ‘black box’ for the skull-bound brain (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). 
On this story, to do its job as a controller of action, the brain needs to 
generate movements that accord with the layout of the organism’s 
immediate surroundings. A real-life snake and a snake-looking cucumber 
mandate different reaction on part of the agent. However, all that the brain 
has direct access to are the effects that the external things impinge on the 
sensory apparatus of the organism. The input is ambiguous, as sensory 
states are underdetermined by the world: in many realistic circumstances, 
the sensory effects of a snake and a cucumber may be quite similar. Hence, 
the task of perception is to recover the most likely external causes of the 
sensory signal – out of a range of some alternatives – so that adaptive action 
can be initiated. This ‘recovery’ is construed in terms of an inference under 
uncertainty. The brain abductively ‘infers’ environmental causes of the 
sensory input, that is, it comes up with hypotheses that best explain (given 
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a larger model of the environment) the sensory patterns by citing their 
worldly causes. This, of course, places PP within a longer history of thinking 
about perception in terms of an abductive inference (Gregory, 1980; 
Helmholtz, 1860/1962). 
The idea that PP is in fact committed to inferentialism about 
perception faces two sorts of criticism. On the one hand, it may be argued 
that the view presented above gets the ‘epistemic’ situation of the brain 
completely wrong. Perception is not underdetermined by sensory 
stimulation because all the required information is already present in the 
physical energies affecting the sensorium; and/or because the brain is, in 
virtue of its wiring, attuned to statistical patterns in the environment to the 
degree where no disambiguating inference is needed (Anderson, 2017; 
Orlandi, 2016, 2017). There is no motivation for postulating inference in the 
first place. I will not address this sort of criticism here, as it seems to be 
properly aimed not at the conservative reading of PP, but the whole PP 
framework itself. It arguably makes obsolete the very postulate that the 
brain implements a nesting, hierarchical model engaged in generating top-
down sensory prediction. On the other hand, it may be argued that the 
notion of inference at play in PP it is either trivially liberal or misconstrues 
what the framework actually postulates (Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld, 
2016). That is, the ‘inferences’ involved are not genuine inferences or the 
inferential approach is not justified by what the PP says about the machinery 
underlying perception, action, and cognition. To address this sort of 
criticism, I want to first elucidate what ‘inference’ as postulated in PP 
amounts to, and then proceed to show that it is neither excessively liberal 
nor does it get PP wrong (for a similar, in-depth defence of the inferential 
nature of PP and related computational models of perception, see Kiefer, 
2017).  
There are three crucial ingredients that make PP genuinely 
inferential. First, note that the commitment to inference is strongly tied to 
the commitment to representation. Given that inference constitutively 
involves transitions between contentful states, the former commitment 
presupposes the latter. In fact, it seems that to treat inference as postulated 
in PP literally, we should go with the stronger, realist brand of 
representationalism. Assuming strong representationalism, there are 
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transitions between genuinely contentful states in PP, as the internal 
hierarchical generative model is changing to keep track of the environment 
at different time-scales. This amounts to updating an action-guiding, 
detachable, error-detection-affording structural representation of the 
environment. Two general transitions involved are (1) revising the current 
estimate to match the current sensory input; (2) learning through 
perception, that is, revising the overall structure of the model (‘priors’) so 
that the prediction error is better minimized over longer periods. The model 
goes from one representational state to another by revising, adding, or 
dropping current hypotheses and long-standing beliefs.  
Second, these representational transitions are approximately 
Bayesian without explicitly representing the Bayes rule. It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that a system that minimizes prediction error is a system that 
performs approximate Bayesian inference by maximizing the posterior 
probability of its model of the environment (see Hohwy, in print; Hohwy, 
Roepstorff & Friston, 2008; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2017). This means that a 
system updating its generative model to minimize prediction error is a 
system that updates its internal estimates of the environment in a way that 
conforms with Bayes rule. As such, given that Bayesian inference embodies 
a rational rule for revising one’s beliefs or subjective probabilities, 
perception (and action, see Hohwy, in print) on PP view turns out to conform 
to a normative principle. Its rationality stems from the fact that Bayesian 
inference is truth-preserving (for a more detailed discussion, see Kiefer, 
2017). And truth-preservation is another constitutive feature of inference. 
Third, it seems that a kind of autonomy is implied in truly inferential 
processes. Suppose that there is succession of events A, B and C and that 
each of those events produces, in turn, an internal representational state A’, 
B’ and C’ in some cognitive agent. Suppose that the move from A’ to B’ to C’ 
conforms to some truth-preserving rule like modus tollens. Because of how 
the transition between the representational states is completely determined 
by external events, it does not seem to count as inference. Inference is 
constitutively an act, a part of agent’s cognitive activity. Importantly, 
representational transitions involved in PP meet this criterion of inference. 
The way that perceptual hypotheses and priors are updated is not a matter 
of passively registering external states. Rather, it is co-shaped by the 
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internal states and dynamics of the prediction-error-minimizng system. The 
perceptual inference and perceptual learning are not completely 
determined by the driving, sensory signal, but actively shaped and 
constrained by the system’s prior ‘knowledge’. So, inference properly counts 
here as an active, not just reactive process. 
Taken together, this amounts to a view of inference as an act of 
representational change that (approximately) conforms to a truth-
preserving rule. This, and nothing more, is the sense in which conservative 
PP is committed to inference. Notably, there may be other considerations in 
favor of the claim that literal inference is involved in PP. For example, Kiefer 
(2017) argues that – in line with some influential treatments of inference in 
philosophical literature – representational transitions in PP (and related 
frameworks) are such that they increase the overall coherence of 
representations involved, that is, their consistency and the number of 
inferential connections between them. Another point might be that because 
the generative model reduces the prediction error relative to the sensory 
signal (as caused by the external world), the representational change can be 
also seen as maximizing the ‘empirical adequacy’ of the model. Nonetheless, 
it must be conceded that the sort of inferential processes postulated in PP 
also lack some of the features that characterize many paradigmatic 
instances of inference. In particular, they are not consciously accessible or 
goal-directed in the sense of being driven by personal-level intentions. But 
it is doubtful whether any of those features is necessary for a cognitive 
process to count as inference (see Kiefer, 2017). 
As mentioned, the idea that full-blown inference is involved in PP can 
raise some skepticism. One reason for this stems from a close inspection of 
the way that the notion of inference is employed in the literature on FEP. As 
some authors point out (Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2016), 
‘inference’ as used in the work of Karl Friston (e.g. 2013) boils down to a 
dynamic coupling between the organism and its environment in which the 
mutual information between the internal (organismal) and external 
(‘hidden’) states is maximized. Because, almost by definition, every 
organism falls under FEP (to live is to actively avoid surprising and seek 
unsurprising states), every organism can count  ‘inferring’ the states of the 
environment in this sense. Furthermore, this notion applies to non-living 
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coupled systems, for example, to a system composed of two coupled 
pendulum clocks (Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2016) There clearly is 
something misleading about treating bacteria or synchronized clocks as 
engaged in literal inference. This very minimal, relaxed usage of the notion 
diverges from a more cognitivist sense that most associate with 
inferentialist view of perception. However, as mentioned at the outset of this 
paper, we need to be careful to distinguish between PP and FEP. This raises 
the possibility that the notion of inference at play in PP is different than the 
one sometimes used in discussions of FEP. And it seems that this is exactly 
the case. ‘Inference’ at use in PP is significantly stronger: it entails far more 
than the coupling of two dynamic systems. It involves an endogenously 
controlled transition between genuinely representational states that 
approximately conforms to a truth-preserving rule. Hence, the concerns 
about trivialization of the notion of inference which can be reasonably 
raised in the context of FEP do not apply to PP. 
Another way to challenge the inferential reading of PP is by trying to 
show that the processes the framework postulates have features that 
prevent them from counting as truly inferential. In particular, some authors 
(Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2016) point to the fact that traditional 
inferential theories of perception rely on an analogy between perception 
and scientific hypothesis testing. But this analogy collapses once we 
consider PP in the context of FEP. When properly construed, the job of the 
perceptual system is not to generate representations that ‘objectively’ 
capture the environment. Perception is a fundamentally biased sort of 
hypothesis-testing enterprise: 
If my brain really is a scientist, then it is heavily invested in ensuring 
the truth of a particular theory, which is the theory that “I am alive”. 
This is a fundamental prior belief that drives all action; namely, I exist 
and I will gather all the evidence at hand to prove it. It will only make 
predictions whose confirmation is in line with this hypothesis. It does 
not give competing hypotheses a fair chance and is extremely biased in 
the way it interprets the data. It decides on the outcome of an 
experiment beforehand (my staying alive) and manipulates the 
experiment until the desired result is reached. If my brain is a scientist, 
it is a crooked and fraudulent scientist (…) (Bruineberg, Kiverstein & 
Rietveld, 2016, pp. 14-15).  
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One might feel tempted to use these considerations as an argument against 
the involvement of inference in PP. But this criticism would beg the question. 
Of course, according to PP, the perceptual system is not interested in truth 
for the sake of it. As mentioned before, it is selective in the way it 
recapitulates the structure of the environment. It is natural to expect that it 
changes its representational states in a way that is systematically biased 
toward the overarching aim of keeping the organism in unsurprising states, 
which sometimes means sacrificing truth or accuracy. Furthermore, it has 
been forcefully argued on PP view of things, action initiation is based on 
systematically misrepresentational precision estimations (Wiese, 2016). Yet, 
it is far from clear why the fact that the way the perceptual system works 
diverges from idealized norms of scientific rationality could prevent the 
system in question from counting as inferential. Because of social factors and 
cognitive biases, the way scientists update their hypotheses in light of 
evidence sometimes (perhaps often) deviates from idealized norms of 
scientific rationality. This hardly makes the updating process non-
inferential. To generalize, crooked inference is inference nonetheless. And 
as I take it, conservative rendering of PP (charitably interpreted) is only 
committed to the idea of perception as inference, not to an importantly 
different and stronger claim that perceptual inference functions to uncover 
truth for the sake of it. 
3. The commitment to internalism 
The last commitment often associated with conservative construal of PP is 
to an internalist view of the mind. Here, ‘internalism’ means a claim that, 
contrary to extended and (strong incarnations of) embodied views, the 
constitutive basis for cognition does not go beyond the boundary of the 
central nervous system. This ‘neurocentric’ or ‘seclusionist’ reading of PP is 
defended by appealing to the notion of a Markov blanket (Hohwy, 2016, 
2017, in print). The concept comes from causal network models and refers 
to nodes of the network such that, given some node X, the state of X is 
statistically fixed (can be fully predicted) by the states of those nodes. The 
Markov blanket of X will thus include its neighboring nodes: its ‘parents’ 
(proximal nodes that activate X), its ‘children’ (proximal nodes activated by 
X) and the parents of its children (Friston, 2013). Now, the point is that 
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internal sensory and ‘active’ (motor) states constitute a Markov blanket for 
a prediction-error-minimizing agent. Less technically, to fully predict how 
agent’s internal states will evolve in time, all that is required is knowledge 
about its internal dynamics and what happens at the sensorimotor Markov 
blanket. Assuming that on the PP view of things cognition is prediction-
error-minimization, the generative-model-based machinery involved in 
minimizing the error is situated within the Markov blanket thus construed. 
This way, the brain and spinal cord emerge as the sole seat of mindedness. 
Relatedly, this also opens up the possibility of skepticism, whereby an agent 
can enjoy a rich cognitive life even if it is being fed its sensory states not by 
the external world (nor does it output its active states to actual body), but 
rather by a misleading demon.  
As noted by the opponents of the conservative reading of PP, this way of 
defending internalism in PP turns out problematic (Clark, 2016a, 2017; 
Fabry, 2017). One particularly forceful criticism points out that the concept 
of a Markov blanket is a technical notion that can be applied to any 
dynamical system to demarcate it from its environment (Clark, 2017). There 
will be Markov-blanketed systems within the prediction-error-minimizing 
agent, from single neurons to particular levels within the hierarchical 
generative model implemented in the brain. In addition, Clark argues that 
nothing prevents us from postulating Markov-blanketed systems that 
encompass the (embodied) brain and parts of the external, technological 
environment. That is, a system that comprises the biological agent equipped 
with technological extensions or interfaces could count as prediction-error-
minimizing agent enclosed within a Markov blanket. In fact, Clark (2017) 
opts for a view that the boundaries of minds change ‘metamorphically’ 
through life as technological extensions are added and subtracted.  
Assuming there is a nesting hierarchy of Markov-blanketed systems that 
go both within and outside the brain, natural questions arise. Which Markov 
blanket is the privileged one when it comes to delineating the mind? And 
why think that the boundary coincides with the blanket that secludes the 
central nervous system? In fact, these considerations leave us with three 
options regarding the idea of a Markov blanket as cognition- or mind-
delineating boundary: (1) there is one, stable, unique blanket that delineates 
cognition and it is the blanket that surrounds the central nervous system; 
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(2) the boundaries of a cognitive system are enclosed by a Markov blanket 
that metamorphically changes to include factors that go beyond the central 
nervous system alone; (3) no Markov blanket serves as a unique, cognition-
demarcating one. Only option (1) counts as genuinely conservative. 
However, the most important lesson is that the technical notion of the 
Markov blanket as such is not enough to decide between these three options 
(Clark, 2017). This means that the justification for internalist reading of PP, 
if it is to be found at all, presumably will not come from the conceptual 
resources of the framework itself. 
Internalism turns out to constitute a soft underbelly of conservatism 
about PP, the one commitment that seems the least justified in light of the 
framework (for other arguments against the internalist reading of PP, see 
Clark, 2016a, 2017; Fabry, 2017). However, two things need to be pointed 
out before the conservatist admits defeat on this front. First, the internalist 
commitment is logically independent from the other two. Most importantly, 
neither representationalism nor inferentialism about PP presuppose the 
truth of internalism. There is nothing contradictory about the idea of a 
system that trades in representations and engages in inferences but whose 
boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of the central nervous 
system. So even if we do drop the internalist commitment, the other two can 
remain intact, leaving us with what is still a recognizably (albeit weakly) 
conservative outlook on the nature of cognition. Second, even if internalism 
cannot be defended by pointing to the notion of a Markov blanket alone, 
there may be other, independent considerations in favor of internalism. In 
particular, it might be interesting to see how PP meshes with other, 
independent theoretical proposals that support delineating cognition in 
internalist, skull-bound way. A full, in-depth discussion of this subject is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, let me briefly sketch out the 
connections beyond PP and some of the well-known, pro-internalist 
conceptions of where cognition ends. 
i. PP and non-derived content  
On one view, what distinguishes cognition from non-cognition is the fact 
that only the former involves processes that make use of non-derived 
intentional content (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2010). This is the content that 
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is intrinsic to the content-bearing state rather than derived from 
conventions or interpretative/explanatory practices. Note that when 
applied to PP, this approach would connect internalist commitment to the 
representational one. Because on the weak, pragmatist/instrumentalist 
reading of representationalism in PP, content is clearly derived (it depends 
in its existence on the explanatory practices of scientists), the connection 
would have to be with the strong branch of representationalism. The 
internal, resemblance-based, action-driving model that the strong reading 
of representations in PP appeals to seems like a good seat for non-derived 
content. The content of this model is based on the structural resemblance 
between the representational vehicle and some (represented) part of the 
environment, such that the degree to which the resemblance holds is 
causally relevant for the success of model-guided actions (Gładziejewski, 
2016; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2017; Williams, 2017). Neither the structure of the 
vehicle, the structure of the represented state of affairs nor the resemblance 
relation itself are observer-dependent; this view of content is realist through 
and through (see also Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017). Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that content here is not of derived nature. Assuming 
further that the generative model that serves as representation turns out 
properly situated within the confines of the skull, we end up with an 
internalist view. The weakness of this proposal lies in the non-derived-
content-based strategy of delineating cognition itself. By definitionally 
linking cognition with representational content, this criterion is hardly 
ecumenical towards 4E approaches. More importantly, it seems to deflate or 
trivialize representationalism by a priori precluding the truth of anti-
representationalism about cognition (Ramsey, 2015). 
ii. PP and cognitive systems 
Another internalist way of demarcating cognition appeals to the notion of a 
cognitive system (Rupert, 2009). Roughly, ‘cognitive systems’ are physical 
systems that causally underlie collections of cognitive capacities and skills. 
These systems are integrated and persisting, and the collections of cognitive 
capacities and skills they give rise to are stable across different contexts. 
Because of their persisting and stable nature, it is cognitive systems that 
enable successful psychological or cognitive-scientific explanation by 
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making possible reliable generalizations about cognition. They give rise to 
stable patterns of cognitive behavior that can be studied under a wide range 
of independent experimental paradigms. The proposal is that only brains (or 
central nervous systems) count as ‘cognitive systems’ in this sense. For 
example, it is argued that ‘extended’ systems which comprise the 
(embodied) brain and parts of the environment are too ephemeral to afford 
successful, generalizable scientific inquiry (Rupert, 2009).  Now, it might be 
hypothesized that the central nervous system qua prediction-error-
minimizing mechanism counts as a cognitive system in this sense. It persists 
across different contexts and gives rise to cognitive phenomena. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that although there are extended 
prediction-error-minimizing systems enclosed by technology-based 
Markov blankets, these are not cognitive, as they are not stable enough to 
underlie successful scientific generalization. If this is true, it could rule out 
Clark’s metamorphically extended predictive minds. The obvious problem, 
however, is that there are Markov blanketed, prediction-error-minimizing 
mechanisms within the central nervous systems. These may be even more 
stable and persisting error minimizing mechanisms within the agent. So, 
there remains something arbitrary about treating the peripheries of the 
central nervous system as the peripheries of cognition. 
iii. PP and pseudo-closed-loop control 
Grush (2003) defends internalist or ‘Cartesian’ demarcation of cognition by 
employing notions from control theory. To put Grush’s sophisticated 
account in a nutshell, the idea is that brains count as sole seats of cognition 
because they are systems for which ‘the world is not enough’. Due to the 
temporal delay that separates the sending of a motor command to the body 
and the sensory feedback resulting from the performed action, the brain is 
unable to perform motor control based on the feedback alone. Rather, it uses 
a pseudo-closed-loop architecture, where an efference copy of motor 
command is sent to an emulator, an internal structure that mimics the 
dynamics of the environment and the muscle-skeletal system. The sensory 
predictions endogenously derived from the emulator are essential, on 
Grush’s account, for planning and fine-tuning ongoing movement. 
Furthermore, the emulator can be employed for purely off-line purposes, 
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like imagery. The upshot is that because of its reliance on an internal 
emulator, the brain emerges as ‘potentially self-contained’ – a system firmly 
distinct from the external environment and (given some other assumptions, 
see Grush 2003) a unique seat of cognition. Now, there is a recognizable 
kinship between emulation theory (and other efference-copy-based 
approaches to motor control) and PP (Dolega, 2017). Most importantly, note 
how perception and action are crucially guided in PP by endogenously 
generated, top-down sensory predictions. Obviously, because of the crucial 
role that the sensory input and error signals have in shaping the internal 
processing, the prediction-error-minizing system is far from being closed-
off from the environment. This does not, however, diverge from Grush’s 
original emulation framework, as, on his view, the sensory feedback 
constantly corrects the emulation-based predictions. Notice also how, in PP, 
when the precision of the sensory signal is predicted to be low (and so the 
sensory input’s influence on hypothesis-revision is also low), or when the 
generative model is used purely off-line, the brain will appear as largely 
causally decoupled from the external environment. Because of those 
considerations, there is potential in PP to construe the brain (or the central 
nervous system) in Grushian way, as a largely self-contained seat of 
cognitive phenomena. 
Conclusions 
When seen within the proper context of the Free Energy Principle, 
minimizing the prediction error with the use of hierarchically structured 
generative models turns out to serve as a tool for self-organization. This 
strong pragmatic and organism-oriented spin on PP naturally invites an 
interpretation of the framework that is much closer to 4E approaches than 
to more orthodox, internalistic and intellectualist approaches in cognitive 
science. However, in the present paper I attempted to elucidate what 
‘conservative’ reading of PP amounts to, hoping to show that this way of 
understanding PP is not ungrounded or completely alien to the spirit of the 
4E approaches. I showed how PP is representational, both in a weak 
(pragmatic) and strong (realist) sense. Even on the strong reading, the 
representations postulated in PP are not just passive mirrors of nature, but 
action-guiding map-like structural representations that largely use 
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modality-specific vehicles and whose content is constrained by the way the 
organism is embodied and embedded in its environmental niche. 
Furthermore, I argued that the notion of inference that (the conservative 
rendering of) PP trades in is non-trivial, yet liberal. The inferential nature of 
perception amounts to the fact that the way the perceptual representations 
are (actively, not just reactively) updated conforms to a truth-preserving 
rule. There is no commitment here to an overly intellectualist claim that 
prediction-error-minimizing agents cognize in accordance to some inflated 
principle of rationality. Lastly, I attempted to show that whatever grounds 
there might be for treating PP in internalist terms, they are probably not to 
be found in the conceptual resources of the framework itself. However, I 
sketched out how PP might fit with some other, independent ways of 
delineating the mind in a skull-bound way. The resulting view is that PP is 
representational and inferential in what might be the most 4E-friendly way 
possible, and it does not have to be considered internalist (at least not on its 
own terms). Taken together, these considerations show that conservative 
reading of PP is well-grounded and not that conservative after all.  
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ABSTRACT 
JUST HOW CONSERVATIVE IS CONSERVATIVE PREDICTIVE 
PROCESSING?  
Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and 
perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction 
error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions 
generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question 
of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and 
representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches 
that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and 
(largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate and 
clarify the cognitivist or ‘conservative’ reading of PP. I argue that the 
conservative commitments of PP can be divided into three distinct 
categories: (1) representationalism, (2) inferentialism, and (3) internalism. 
I show how these commitments and their relations should be understood 
and argue for an interpretation of each that is both non-trivial and largely 
ecumenical towards the 4E literature. Conservative PP is as progressive as 
conservatism gets. 
KEYWORDS: embodied cognition; enactivism; Free Energy Principle; 
inference; internalism; Predictive Processing; mental representation 
 
